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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
ST ATE OF GEORGIA 
TARA SCOTT; BAILEY M. CARTER; and ) 
WILSON CARTER, Individually, as Trustee ) 
of THE WILSON M. CARTER 1988 ) 
TRUST, and as Next Friend of MARY ) 
WILSON CARTER, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
JOHN J. CARR and ) 
JOHN MATTHEW DWYER, III, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Civil Action 
File No. 20 l 7CV297083 
Bus. Case Div. 2 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS 
The above styled action is before the Court on: (1) Defendant John J. Carr's Motion to 
Dismiss (filed Dec. 26, 2017) (Carr's "Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint"); 
(2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Subpoenas to Vantage Corporation and Vantage Advisory 
Management, LLC (filed Feb. 15, 2018); (3) Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss Claims 
Brought by Plaintiff Wilson Carter as Trustee for the Bailey Middleton Carter 2009 Trust and the 
Mary Wilson Carter 2009 Trust for Lack of Standing (filed Mar. 15, 2018) (Carr's "Motion to 
Dismiss Certain Trusts' Claims"); ( 4) Defendant Carr's Amended Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and First Amended Complaint (filed May 11, 2018) (Carr's "Amended Motion to 
Dismiss"); (5) Defendant John Matthew Dwyer, Ill's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
(filed May 17, 2018); and (6) Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint 
(filed Aug. 13, 2018) ("Motion to Dismiss the SAC"). Having considered the relevant portions of 
the record with respect to each of these motions I as well as argument of counsel at hearings held 
on Jun 28, 20 I 8 and Sept. 7, 2018, the Court finds as follows: 
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 
In this action Plaintiffs allege Defendants John J. Carr ("Carr") and John Matthew Dwyer 
("Dwyer") violated state and federal securities laws and committed other torts when they 
solicited and sold to Plaintiffs shares in Vantage Corporation and its related entities (collectively 
"Vantage"). Vantage is a technology and investment company that specializes in proprietary 
trading technology, using trading algorithms and models to process financial trading data in real 
time in order to exploit trading opportunities to generate investment retums.2 Vantage Advisory 
Management, LLC ("V AM") is a subsidiary of Vantage, formed as the investment advisor firm 
for Vantage's asset management division.3 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Carr and Dwyer, acting on behalf of and as agents of 
Vantage and/or YAM, solicited them to purchase Vantage stock. According to Plaintiffs, 
between January and March of 2016 and based on Defendant Carr and Dwyer's representations 
and solicitations: Wilson Carter and the Wilson M. Carter I 988 Trust (collectively "Carter") 
invested a total of $2,000,000 in Vantage; Tara Scott ("Scott") invested a total of $2,000,000; 
Bailey Carter ("Bailey") invested a total of $500,000; and Mary Wilson Carter ("Mary"), a 
minor, invested a total of $500,000. 
Regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Court has 
limited its review to the pleadings except with respect to the jurisdictional issue raised by Defendant Carr in his 
Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint due to the forum selection clause in the relevant Shareholders 
Agreements. See Part IV.B.ii, infra. See also O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b); Campbell v. Ailion, 338 Ga. App. 382,384 n. 
2, 790 S.E.2d 68, 71 (2016) ("Documents attached to a brief in support of [a] motion to dismiss ... cannot be 
considered in deciding the motion to dismiss") (citation and punctuation omitted); Laibe Corp. v. Gen. Pump & 
Well, Inc., 317 Ga. App. 827, 830-3 l, 733 S.E.2d 332, 335-36 (2012) ("[T]he consideration of matters outside 
the pleadings on a l 2(b )(2) or l 2(b )(3) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue does 
not convert the motion to one for summary judgment"). 
2 Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), 113. 
3 SAC, 19. 
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However, Plaintiffs assert that at the time they were sold the Vantage shares the stock 
was not a federal covered security, was not subject to an effective registration statement and was 
not exempt from registration. Plaintiffs also allege Defendants received direct or indirect 
compensation from Vantage for their role in soliciting investments but were not registered as 
securities salespeople or as investment advisors. Further, according to Plaintiffs, Defendants 
intentionally made misleading statements of material fact and omitted material facts when 
soliciting Plaintiffs; e.g., material misstatements and omissions related to the past performance of 
Vantage, Plaintiffs' status as general partners, and Vantage's ownership of certain proprietary 
software required to operate the business, among others. These material misrepresentations and 
omission alleged induced Plaintiffs to purchase shares and to hold their investments in Vantage 
ultimately causing them to suffer damages. 
Plaintiffs initially filed suit against Vantage and other related companies in the District 
Court of Delaware related to their investments in Vantage.4 Plaintiffs subsequently filed this 
action against Carr and Dwyer alleging they are individually liable for offering for sale and 
selling Plaintiffs the Vantage stock in violation of state and federal law. Plaintiffs assert the 
following causes of action in the SAC: (1) violations of the Georgia Uniform Securities Act of 
20085, O.C.G.A. § 10-5-20, for the sale of unregistered and non-exempt securities; (2) violations 
of O.C.G.A. § 10-5-31 for the sale of securities by individuals not properly registered; 
(3) violations of Section 12 of the Securities Act of 19336, 15 U.S.C. §77l(a)(2) alleging 
misrepresentations in connection with the sale of a security; ( 4) negligence; (5) violations of 
O.C.G.A. § 10-5-50 et seq. for making untrue statements of material fact and/or omitting material 
4 Tara Scott et al. v. Vantage Corporation et al., No. 
District of Delaware ("Delaware Action"). 
5 Hereinafter "Georgia Securities Act". 
6 Hereinafter "the 1933 Act". 
l 7-448-MPT, United States District Court for the 
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facts necessary to make statements not misleading and/or substantially participating m the 
making of misrepresentations of material fact, all in the context of offering for sale or selling 
securities; (6) common law fraud; (7) sale of securities to a minor in her individual capacity 
(asserted by Mary); (8) attorneys' fees; (9) punitive damages; (10) violations of the Colorado 
Securities Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 11-51-101 et seq. (asserted by Scott); and (11) breach of 
fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs tender their Vantage stock and seek rescission of their purchases of 
Vantage stock and return of any consideration paid plus interest, court costs and expenses, 
attorney's fees, punitive damages, and other compensatory damages. 
This action was filed on Oct. 25, 2017. Following a hearing on Jun. 28, 2018 on various 
pending motions, the Court on Jun. 29, 2018 entered an order requiring Plaintiffs to amend their 
pleadings to provide a more definite statement as to the factual allegations giving rise to their 
claims. Plaintiffs, thus, filed their SAC on Jul. 13, 2018, Defendant Carr moved to dismiss the 
SAC on Aug. 13, 2018 and argument on that motion was heard on Sept. 7, 2018. The Court now 
considers the pending motions in light of the SAC and the current posture of the case. 
I. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Subpoenas to Vantage Corporation and Vantage 
Advisory Management, LLC 
Plaintiffs moved to enforce Subpoenas for the Production of Evidence at Deposition that 
were served upon Vantage and Vantage Advisory Management, LLC ("V AM") on Dec. 6, 2017. 
However, on May 4, 2018, Vantage and VAM filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 
11 of Title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.7 Accordingly, this motion is STAYED pending 
resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings or other relief from the Bankruptcy Court. 
See In re Vantage Corporation, Case No. 18-57728, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia; In re Vantage Advisory Management, LLC, Case No. 18-5773 l, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia. 
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II. Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss Certain Trusts' Claims 
Defendant Carr moved to dismiss the claims asserted in the original complaint by Wilson 
Carter as trustee of the Bailey Middleton Carter 2009 Trust and the Mary Wilson Carter 2009 
Trust ("Trusts") for lack of standing because the Trusts never purchased Vantage stock. Rather, 
Bailey M. Carter ("Bailey") and Mary Wilson Carter ("Mary") each purchased Vantage stock in 
their individual capacities. However, insofar as the Court previously granted Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Substitute Bailey Carter and Mary Wilson Carter, Through her Next Friend Wilson Carter[,] 
as Plaintiffs, thereby substituting Bailey and Mary, respectively, as the real parties in interest, 
Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss Certain Trusts' Claims is DENIED as moot. 
III. Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint and Amended 
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant Dwyer's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings 
The Court finds the arguments raised in Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss the Original 
Complaint and Amended Motion to Dismiss have either been mooted by Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint and, thus, are DENIED as moot, or are addressed in Part IV, infra, with 
respect to Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss the SAC. 
IV. Motion to Dismiss the SAC 
A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss 
A motion to dismiss brought under O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless: 
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the 
claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable 
facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that 
the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the 
framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the 
relief sought. .. 
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Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75, 755 S.E.2d 796, 798-99 (2014) (citing Anderson v. Flake, 
267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308, 309, 800 S.E.2d 
366, 368 (2017), reconsideration denied (June 5, 2017). "When the sufficiency of the complaint 
is questioned by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, 
the rules require that it be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with all doubts 
resolved in his favor even though unfavorable constructions are possible." Cobb Cty. v. Jones 
Grp. P.L.C., 218 Ga. App. 149,152,460 S.E.2d 516,520 (1995) (citing Time Ins. Co. v. Fulton- 
DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 211 Ga. App. 34, 35,438 S.E.2d 149 (1993)). 
Under the notice pleading procedure of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, only "[a] short 
and plain statement of the claims" is required. O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-8(a)(2)(A). Nevertheless, "a 
complaint must give a defendant notice of the claim in terms sufficiently clear to enable him to 
frame a responsive pleading thereto." Patrick v. Verizon Directories Corp., 284 Ga. App. 123, 
124, 643 S.E.2d 251, 252 (2007) (quoting Allen v. Bergman, 201 Ga. App. 781, 783(3)(b) 
(1991)). See Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 104, 796 S.E.2d 489, 491 (2017) 
("[A] plaintiff is not required to 'plead in the complaint facts sufficient to set out each element of 
a cause of action so long as it puts the opposing party on reasonable notice of the issues that must 
be defended against") (quoting Cleveland v. MidFirst Bank, 335 Ga. App. 465, 465, 781 S.E.2d 
577 (2016)). 
B. Analysis 
i. Whether Vantage is a necessary and indispensable party 
Defendant Carr asserts Vantage is an indispensable party that cannot be joined to this 
action due to the previously filed suit Plaintiffs brought against it in Delaware as well as 
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Vantage's pending Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Thus, Carr urges the Court should dismiss 
the SAC in its entirety. 
O.C.G.A. §9-11-19 governs the joinder of indispensable parties. It provides in part: 
(a) A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party 
in the action if: 
( 1) In his absence complete relief cannot be afforded among those who are 
already parties; or 
(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may: 
(A) As a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest; or 
(B) Leave any of the persons who are already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. 
"If a trial court concludes that a party described in O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-19(a) cannot be joined as a 
party for venue, lack of jurisdiction, or some other reason, then the trial court 'shall determine 
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it or 
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable."' Parsons v. Mertz, 
320 Ga. App. 786, 790, 740 S.E.2d 743, 747 (2013) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-19(b)). 
In making that determination, the Court must consider five factors: 
(1) To what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be 
prejudicial to him or to those already parties; 
(2) The extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the 
shaping of relief, or by other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; 
(3) Whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; 
( 4) Whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is 
dismissed for nonjoinder; and 
(5) Whether and by whom prejudice might have been avoided or may, in 
the future, be avoided. 
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Here, having considered the above authorities the Court finds that, even if Vantage is a 
necessary party that cannot be joined in light of the Delaware Action and Vantage's pending 
bankruptcy proceedings, such does not warrant dismissal of this action. Importantly, the Georgia 
Securities Act contemplates that sellers of securities and agents that sell securities may be liable 
to purchasers for violations of various provisions of the act and others involved in such 
transactions may also be jointly and severally liable. See generally O.C.G.A. § 10-5-58. Whereas 
protective measures and relief, here, may be shaped to lessen any prejudice to Vantage, if this 
action is dismissed in its entirety for nonjoinder, Plaintiffs will have no adequate remedy against 
Defendants Carr and Dwyer who it appears are not subject to the jurisdiction of Delaware courts. 
Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss the SAC on the basis of the failure to join Vantage is hereby 
DENIED. 
ii. Choice of law and forum selection clause 
Defendant Carr argues that Plaintiffs, by executing a Shareholders Agreement to 
purchase Vantage stock agreed that Delaware law would govern litigation arising out of the 
Shareholders Agreement and submitted themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and 
federal courts of Delaware to adjudicate such litigation. Because this action arises from the 
Shareholders Agreement, Carr urges it has been brought in violation of the forum selection 
clause and is subject to dismissal. 
Although this litigation involves the Vantage stock purchased in connection with the 
Shareholders Agreement, Carr and Dwyer are not parties to the agreement and, thus, do not have 
standing to enforce its provisions. See GCA Strategic Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Joseph Charles & 
Assocs., Inc., 245 Ga. App. 460, 463, 537 S.E.2d 677, 681 (2000) (brokers sued for securities 
fraud and common law fraud could not rely on stock purchase agreement's merger clause since 
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they were not parties to that agreement). Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss the SAC on this 
basis is therefore DENIED. 
iii. Whether SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
I. Claims of Bailey and Mary 
Defendant Carr urges the claims asserted by Bailey and Mary should be dismissed as a 
matter of law because Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege that Carr solicited or 
intentionally made any misrepresentations of material fact or omissions of material fact to Bailey 
or Mary. The Court agrees. As to Counts I-VI, VIII-IX, and XI of the SAC, to state a cause of 
action Bailey and Mary must allege some misconduct by Defendants directed at them related to 
their purchase of Vantage stock. However, Plaintiffs only allege that Bailey "overheard" a 
conversation between her father and non-party Brian Askew regarding Vantage, requested more 
information from her father, her father "conveyed the contents of prior communications" to her, 
and ultimately in February 2016 she decided to purchase Vantage stock. No factual basis is 
provided at all for Mary's purported decision to invest in Vantage in February 2016. Importantly, 
there is no allegation that Carr ( or Dwyer) ever met or solicited Bailey or Mary or that he knew 
what information was being "conveyed" by their father to them, much less that Carr intentionally 
made any material misrepresentations or omission to Bailey or Mary which they could have 
reasonably relied on in making their investment decisions. 
With respect to Count VII (sale of securities to a minor), Plaintiffs allege that at the time 
Mary purchased Vantage stock she was thirteen years old and, thus, considered a minor under 
Georgia law such that the contract is voidable. Defendant Carr urges Mary's claim for sale of 
securities to a minor whereby she seeks to void the Stock Subscription Agreement must be 
dismissed because Vantage, the other party to the agreement, is not a party to this action. 
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Notably, Mary here seeks to void a contract, not as a remedy available under the Georgia 
Securities Act, but under general contract law. 
"In Georgia, a minor is generally under a disability to contract, but the contract is not ipso 
facto void and the option to disaffirm is personal to him." Jones v. State, 119 Ga. App. 105, 106 
(1969) (citations omitted). See O.C.G.A. §13-3-20 ("Generally the contract of a minor is 
voidable"). A "void" contract "does not exist at law" but a "voidable" contract gives rise to "a 
right of rescission due to some defect or illegality." Georgia Receivables, Inc. v. Welch, 242 Ga. 
App. 146, 148, 529 S.E.2d 164, 167 (2000). However, in the absence of privity of contract, no 
rescission of a contract can be granted. See Sofet v. Roberts, 185 Ga. App. 451, 452, 364 S.E.2d 
595, 597 (1987). Here, insofar as Vantage is not a party to this action, Mary has no basis under 
O.C.G.A. § 13-3-20 to seek rescission from Defendants.8 
Accordingly, Carr's Motion to Dismiss the SAC is hereby GRANTED as to all claims 
asserted by Bailey and Mary Carter. 9 
2. Heightened pleading standard under O.C.G.A. §9-I J-9(b) 
Defendant Carr argues the SAC is defective as a matter of law, asserting it fails to 
comply with the heighted pleading requirements of O.C.G.A. §9-11-9(b ). That code section 
provides: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstance constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a 
person may be averred generally." However, "[a]lthough fraud must be pied with particularity 
under O. C. G .A. § 9-1 l -9(b ), 'a complaint alleging fraud should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the pleader can prove no set of facts in support 
The Court makes no ruling at this time on whether rescission is a remedy available with respect to 
securities fraud claims asserted against agents who are not parties to the subject transaction. 
9 The remainder of this order addresses the claims asserted by Plaintiffs Carter and Scott. Thus, hereinafter 
all references to "Plaintiffs" refers only to those Plaintiffs. 
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of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith. Inc., 284 Ga. App. 387, 394, 643 S.E.2d 864, 871 (2007) (quoting SRH, Inc. v. IFC 
Credit Corp., 275 Ga. App. 18, 19, 619 S.E.2d 744 (2005)). 
The Court finds the securities fraud and common law fraud claims are pled with 
sufficient particularity. Plaintiffs allege specific meetings and communications during which 
intentional misrepresentations and omissions of fact were allegedly made to Plaintiffs Carter and 
Scott which were made by or are directly attributable to Defendant Carr and upon which 
Plaintiffs relied in purchasing and holding their Vantage stock, causing them to suffer economic 
losses and damages.1° For example, Plaintiffs allege Carter misrepresented that: Vantage was 
raising funds for the first time and that Vantage was engaging in a fundraising round for the 
"General Partnership"; funds from each investor would be "segregated with specific systematic 
risk parameters"; Vantage had I 00% ownership of all the propriety software and IP systems it 
used to implement its trading strategy on behalf of investors and that Vantage began developing 
this "custom software" in 1994; Vantage had a history of "astronomical audited returns"; and 
Carr had personally invested in Vantage. 11 These alleged misrepresentations are not mere 
opinions about future performance or puffery as suggested by Defendant Carr and their 
materiality cannot be determined based only on the pleadings. Further, although Carr asserts the 
SAC contains no allegation that he received anything from or as a result of Plaintiffs' purchases 
of Vantage stock, Plaintiffs allege Carr was compensated for his solicitation of investors.12 
Subject to the Court's rulings below, the Motion to Dismiss the SAC on the basis that it does not 
comply with Georgia's heightened pleading standard is DENIED. 
10 
II 
12 
See, e.g., SAC, ,i,i 28-32, 42-50, 58-62, 65-67, 72-86, 112-118, 120-124. 
SAC, iliJ 42, 45, 59, 65, 79, 82, 86, 104, 114, 12 l. 
SAC, iJiJ 29, 86(4), 92, 100. 
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3. General argument SAC should be dismissed as a shotgun pleading 
The fact that each count incorporates all factual allegations of the preceding paragraphs 
does not perforce require dismissal as suggested by Defendant Carr. The SAC describes various 
meetings at which Carr and Plaintiffs were present as well as communications prepared by or in 
conjunction with Carr and forwarded to Carter and Scott, all allegedly for the specific purpose of 
soliciting Plaintiffs to purchase Vantage stock. Thus, subject to the Court's other rulings herein, 
the allegations in the SAC state claims for relief and are sufficient to place Defendant Carr on 
notice of the claims asserted against him. Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss the SAC on this 
basis is DENIED. 
4. Count I: Violations of 0. C. G.A. § 10-5-20 
Plaintiffs allege Defendant Carr violated O.C.G.A. § l 0-5-20 because they offered and 
sold the Vantage stock to them at a time when the stock was not a federal covered security and 
was not subject to an effective registration statement pursuant to the Georgia Security Act. 
O.C.G.A. § l 0-5-20 provides: 
It is unlawful for a person to offer or sell a security in this state unless: 
( 1) The security is a federal covered security; 
(2) The security, transaction, or offer is exempted from registration under 
Code Sections 10-5-10 through 10-5-12; or 
(3) The security is registered under this chapter. 
See also O.C.G.A. § l 0-5-2(9) ("'Federal covered security' means a security that is, or upon 
completion of a transaction will be, a covered security under Section 18(b) of the Securities Act 
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Section 77r(b), or rules or regulations adopted pursuant to that provision."); 
15 U.S.C. §77r(a)(l)(A), (b)(4)(F) (A "covered securities" includes any security exempt from 
federal securities registration "pursuant to ... Commission rules or regulations issued under [§4(2) 
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §77d(2)]"). 
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Defendant Carr asserts Plaintiffs' claims alleging he offered and sold unregistered 
securities in violation of § 10-5-20 fails because the stock was sold by Vantage, not Carr, and 
there is no factual allegation supporting a conclusion that Carr offered or sold a security a 
Georgia. However, Plaintiffs plainly allege Carr offered to sell and sold them Vantage stock in 
Georgia in violation of § I 0-5-20 and cite to specific meetings that took place in Georgia and 
communications sent to Plaintiffs in Georgia. This is sufficient to bring the transactions at issue 
within the purview of the Georgia Securities Act. See generally O.C.G.A. § 10-5-79. 
Carr also contends that, insofar as Plaintiffs have alleged that the Vantage stock was sold 
"in reliance upon the exemption from registration known as Regulation D", they have conceded 
that the securities were federal "covered securities" sold pursuant to federal exemption rules. 
Carr cites out-of-state federal district court cases for the proposition that an allegation that a 
security was offered or sold "pursuant" to an SEC rule or regulation is sufficient to establish the 
securities sold are federal "covered securities" for purposes of defeating and otherwise 
preempting state claims "[r]egardless of whether the private placement actually complied with 
the substantive requirements of [the federal rule or regulation]." Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. 
Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (S.D. Fla. 2002). See id.; Lillard v. Stockton, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1116 
(N.D. Okla. 2003); Pinnacle Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Family Mortg. Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 
1073, 1087 (D. Minn. 2006). See also National Securities Markets Improvement Act 
("NSMIA"), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(a)(l)(A) (preempting state regulations with respect to federal 
"covered securities"). 
However, it appears the majority view is that a state law claim for the sale of unregistered 
securities is preempted only if the security offering actually complies with federal exemption 
requirements. See, e.g., Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 912 (6th Cir. 
13 
2007) ("[W]e hold that NSMIA preempts state securities registration laws with respect only to 
those offerings that actually qualify as 'covered securities' according to the regulations that the 
SEC has promulgated"); Ciuffitelli for Tr. of Ciuffitelli Revocable Tr. v. Deloitte & Touche 
LLP, No. 3:16-CV-580-AC, 2017 WL 2927481, at *18 (0. Or. Apr. 10, 2017),report and 
recommendation adopted sub nom. Ciuffitelli v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, No. 3: 16-CV-00580- 
AC, 2017 WL 2927150 (D. Or. July 5, 2017) ("A split of authority exists regarding whether 
NSMIA preempts state securities laws when a security sale relies on a putative exemption, 
regardless of whether the security in fact qualified for the exemption ... The court concludes 
NSMIA preemption is limited to securities that actually qualify as covered securities under 
federal law"); Janvey v. Willis of Colorado Inc., No. 3: 13-CV-3980-N, 2014 WL 12670763, at 
*11 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2014), amended sub nom. Official Stanford Inv'rs Comm. v. Willis of 
Colorado, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-3980-N, 2015 WL 13742125 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2015) ("Based on 
the plain language of the NSMIA, this Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation and 
holds that the 'NSMIA preempts state securities registration laws with respect only to those 
offerings that actually qualify as 'covered securities' according to the regulations that the SEC 
has promulgated"') (quoting Brown, 481 F. 3d at 912); Consol. Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Dep't of 
Corps., 162 Cal. App. 4th 598, 608, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 795, 804 (2008) ("[W]e are persuaded by 
the cases that have declined to follow Temple, and we align ourselves with the authorities which 
have stated the obvious: a security has to actually be a 'covered security' before federal 
preemption applies") (citations and internal punctuation omitted); Grubka v. WebAccess Int'L 
Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006), amended, No. CIV 05CV02483LTBOES, 
2006 WL 2527815 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2006) ("If Congress had intended that an offeror's 
representation of exemption should suffice it could have said so, but did not. Such an intent 
14 
seems unlikely, in any event; that a defendant could avoid liability under state law simply by 
declaiming its alleged compliance with Regulation D is an unsavory proposition and would 
eviscerate the statute"); Hamby v. Clearwater Consulting Concepts, LLLP, 428 F. Supp. 2d 915, 
921 (E.D. Ark. 2006) ("[T]he only way to assert federal preemption is to first show that an 
exemption from federal registration actually applies"; holding that the mere statement in a 
partnership agreement stating that the sale was made pursuant to an exemption from federal 
registration is insufficient to establish an exemption from registration requirements). The Court 
is persuaded by these authorities and their progeny. 
Carr also argues Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because their allegation that the securities 
at issue were not exempt from registration is unsupported by any specific factual allegation. 
However, Plaintiffs have alleged Mary was thirteen years old when she purchased Vantage stock 
and, thus, was not an "accredited investor" under Regulation D. 13 Further, Plaintiffs allege 
neither Baily nor Mary "executed an investor questionnaire in connection with their purchases of 
Vantage stock ... nor were they asked to provide any evidence of their financial wherewithal."!" 
These allegations provide some factual support for Plaintiffs' assertion that the Vantage 
securities were not exempt from registration requirements. Finally, although Carr urges that 
Plaintiffs are estopped from asserting they are not accredited investors pursuant to the Regulation 
D exemption given representations and warranties in the Stock Subscription Agreements to the 
contrary, such is not a matter which can be determined as a matter of law based solely on the 
pleadings and in light of the allegations contained in the SAC. The Court finds Plaintiffs have 
sufficiently stated a claim for violations of O.C.G.A. § l 0-5-20 and, thus, Defendant Carr's 
Motion to Dismiss the SAC is DENIED as to Count I as asserted by Carter and Scott. 
13 
14 
SAC, il56. 
SAC, il57. 
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5. Count II: Violations ofO.C.G.A. §10-5-31 
Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated O.C.G.A. § 10-5-31 because "neither Carr nor 
Dwyer were registered as a securities salesperson or an investment advisor with the Georgia 
Commissioner of Securities. "15 
O.C.G.A. § 10-5-31 (a) provides: "It is unlawful for an individual to transact business in 
this state as an agent unless the individual is registered under this chapter as an agent or is 
exempt from registration as an agent under subsection (b) of this Code section." Under the 
Georgia Securities Act, "agent" is defined as: "[A]n individual, other than a broker-dealer, who 
represents a broker-dealer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities or 
who represents an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of the issuer's 
securities. A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer or issuer or an individual having a 
similar status or performing similar functions may be an agent if the individual performs the 
duties of an agent." 
Defendant Carr asserts the SAC is facially defective because there is no factual allegation 
supporting Plaintiffs' assertion that Dwyer and Carr "represented" and therefore were "agents" 
of Vantage and only "speculates" that Dwyer and Carr were not exempt from registration. 
However, Plaintiffs have alleged that Carr at one point was a director of Vantage and that when 
soliciting Plaintiffs to purchase Vantage stock he was acting on Vantage's behalf, used email 
addresses associated with Vantage, and received commissions or other remuneration for 
soliciting investors.16 The Court finds Plaintiffs Carter and Scott have sufficiently stated a claim 
under O.C.G.A. § 10-5-31 and whether Defendants are exempt from its registration requirement 
cannot be determined as a matter of law from the pleadings. See also O.C.G.A. § 10-5-52 ("In a 
15 
16 
SAC, ii99. 
SAC, ,i,i 8, 28-29, 30, 34-35, 86, 100. 
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civil action or administrative proceeding under th[ e Georgia Securities Act], a person claiming 
an exemption, exception, preemption, or exclusion has the burden to prove the applicability of 
the claim"). Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the SAC with respect to Count II as asserted by 
Carter and Scott is DENIED. 
6. Count III: Violation of I 5 U.S. C. §77l(a)(2) (Section I 2(a)(2) of 
the 1933 Securities Act) 
Plaintiffs allege that in selling Vantage stock Defendants used instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce to make misleading statements of material fact or omissions of material fact 
in violation of Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §771l(a)(2). Defendant 
Carr asserts the claim is time barred under the applicable one year statute of limitations. 
With respect to such claims, 15 U.S.C. §77m provides: "No action shall be maintained to 
enforce any liability created under section ... 77l(a)(2) of this title unless brought within one year 
after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have 
been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence." (Emphasis added). 
"This statute of limitations applies an objective 'inquiry notice' 
analysis." Gerin v. Aegon USA. Inc., 242 Fed.Appx. 631, 632 (11th Cir. 
2007). "'Inquiry notice is the term used for knowledge of facts that would 
lead a reasonable person to begin investigating the possibility that his legal 
rights had been infringed.' "Id. (quoting Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 
1219, 1228 (I Ith Cir. 2001)). 
Barron v. Lampley, No. 4:15-CV-0038-HLM, 2016 WL 5334472, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2016) 
(but noting a split among federal courts with respect to whether an inquiry notice standard or 
the discovery rule applies to the statute of limitations for § 12( a)(2) claims and that the Eleventh 
Circuit has not yet addressed the issue). 
This action was filed on Oct. 25, 2017. According to the SAC from July through 
December 2016 Carr "assured Plaintiffs that Vantage was profitable in various communications" 
17 
and "claimed Vantage would soon become a billion dollar company with investments from 
wealthy individuals including investors in Monaco and various celebrities.Y'{ In reliance on these 
representations Plaintiffs allegedly continued to hold their Vantage investments.18 Construing the 
SAC in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs with all doubts resolved in their favor even though 
unfavorable constructions are possible, whether Plaintiffs' claims are time barred is an issue 
which cannot be resolved based solely on the pleadings. Thus, Carr's Motion to Dismiss the 
SAC is DENIED with respect to Count III as asserted by Plaintiffs Carter and Scott. 
7. Count IV: Negligence 
Plaintiffs generally allege Defendants owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs as purchasers of 
the Vantage securities and violated that duty "based upon the acts and omissions" set forth in the 
SAC. Defendant Carr asserts the SAC fails to set forth factual allegations establishing the 
requisite elements of a negligence claim. The Court agrees. 
Notably, throughout the SAC Plaintiffs consistently allege Defendants' acted willfully 
and with the intent to deceive and defraud them, not that they acted negligently. Further, the 
allegations specific to Plaintiffs' negligence claim contain only boilerplate, conclusory assertions 
devoid of any facts whatsoever. The Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for 
negligence. Accordingly, Defendant Carr's Motion to Dismiss the SAC is GRANTED as to 
Count IV. 
8. Counts V and VJ: Securities fraud and common law fraud 
In Counts V and VI Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in securities fraud in violation 
of O.C.G.A. §§ 10-5-50 et seq. and common law fraud by making and/or substantially 
participating in the making of false and misleading statements of material fact and/or omissions 
17 
18 
SAC, 173. 
SAC, 174. 
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of material fact upon which Plaintiffs relied to their detriment when purchasing Vantage stock. 
Defendant Carr urges the SAC fails to plead fraud with sufficient particularity. 
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-5-50, 
[i]t is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of a security, directly or indirectly: 
(1) To employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) To make an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which it is made, not misleading; or 
(3) To engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon another person. 
As to Plaintiffs' common law fraud claim, 
[t]he elements essential to an action in tort for damages resulting from a 
material misrepresentation constituting fraud are: (1) that the defendant 
made the representations; (2) that at the time he knew they were false ... ; 
(3) that he made them with the intention and purpose of deceiving 
the plaintiff; (4) that the plaintiff [justifiably] relied on such 
representations; [ and] (5) that the plaintiff sustained the alleged loss and 
damage as the proximate result of their having been made. 
GCA Strategic Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Joseph Charles & Assocs., Inc., 245 Ga. App. 460, 463-64, 537 
S.E.2d 677, 681-82 (2000) (citation omitted) (allegations that securities broker represented to 
stock purchase that corporation was best company that seller had in its portfolio, that purchaser 
bought portfolio, and that corporation then declared bankruptcy three weeks later stated claims 
against broker for securities fraud, common law fraud, and negligent representation). 
As held in Part fV.B.iii.2, supra, the Court finds Plaintiffs Carter and Scott have 
sufficiently pied their fraud claims against Defendant Carr. Although Carr argues that allegations 
regarding his having "worked with" Askew on communications sent by Askew to Plaintiffs 
essentially purports to assert a claim for "aiding and abetting" securities fraud, the SAC alleges 
more than mere aiding and abetting. Plaintiffs specifically allege that in 2016 Carr arranged for 
Plaintiff Carter to "receive investor guides citing 'audited returns,' 'performance summaries,' 
19 
'forecasts', and numerous email communications which contain misrepresentations and 
omissions."19 They also allege that during that time period, Brian Askew, a principle of Vantage, 
forwarded several communications to Carter from Carr which Askew and Carr allegedly drafted 
together "for the purpose of distributing them [to] potential buyers", communications which 
Plaintiffs contend contain material misrepresentations.i'' Thus, rather than mere aiding and 
abetting, Plaintiffs allege Carr was directly and substantially involved in soliciting them through 
misrepresentations in these communications. See O.C.G.A. § l 0-5-50 (making certain fraudulent 
acts in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of securities unlawful whether done "directly 
or indirectly"). 
Further, although Carr asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' "holder claims" predicated on 
forwarded communications, "Georgia law permits holder claims where, as here, [P]laintiffs 
allege that misrepresentations were directed at them to their injury." Holmes v. Grubman, 286 
Ga. 636, 639-40, 691 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2010) (emphasis added). This is not a situation in which 
private emails were forwarded to Carter and Scott without Carr's knowledge or permission. 
Rather, Plaintiffs allege Carr and Askew worked together to draft communications with the 
intent of soliciting investors. Assuming these allegations are true, as the Court is required to do 
when considering Carr's motion, who forwarded the email solicitations to Plaintiffs is not 
dispositive. Further, the allegations regarding email communications cannot be considered in 
isolation but rather, according to Plaintiffs, where part of an ongoing effort throughout 2016 to 
directly solicit Plaintiffs' investments in Vantage-efforts which include email communications, 
investor guides citing audited returns, performance summaries, and forecasts as well as in person 
meetings. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs Carter and Scott's holder claims are sufficiently pied. 
19 
20 
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Defendant Carr also contends the SAC fails to plead scienter with sufficient specificity. 
Scienter is an element of a claim brought under O.C.G.A. § l 0-5-50 as well as a claim for 
common law fraud. See Sims v. Nat. Prod. of Georgia, LLC, 337 Ga. App. 20, 23, 785 S.E.2d 
659,663 (2016) ("O.C.G.A. §10-5-50 requires a showing of intent to defraud") (citing Branan v. 
State, 285 Ga. App. 717, 720(2)(a), 647 S.E.2d 606 (2007)); Baja Properties, LLC v. Mattera, 
345 Ga. App. 101, 105, 812 S.E.2d 358,363 (2018) ("The tort of fraud has five elements: a false 
representation by a defendant, scienter, intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from 
acting, justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and damage to plaintiff') (quoting Mecca Constr., Inc. v. 
Maestro Investments, 320 Ga. App. 34, 41 (3) (b), 739 S.E.2d 51 (2013)). 
"Scienter must be pleaded with particular facts that give rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted in a severely reckless manner." GCA Strategic Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Joseph Charles 
& Assocs., Inc., 245 Ga. App. 460, 464, 537 S.E.2d 677, 682 (2000) (citing Bryant v. Avado 
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir.1999)). 
However, when pleading fraud, "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other 
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally," [O.C.G.A. §9- 
1 l-9(b )] not specifically. This holds true because, "[ e ]xcept in plain and 
indisputable cases, scienter in actions based on fraud is an issue of fact for 
jury determination." [(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lloyd v. 
Kramer, 233 Ga. App. 372, 373(1), 503 S.E.2d 632 (1998).] Indeed, 
scienter deals with "a subjective state of mind seldom capable of direct 
proof." [Quill v. Newberry, 238 Ga. App. 184, 189(l)(c), 518 S.E.2d 189 
(1999).] 
Goldston v. Bank of Am. Corp., 259 Ga. App. 690,697,577 S.E.2d 864, 871 (2003). 
Taking the allegations of the SAC as a whole and construing them in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently pied scienter. Plaintiff 
repeatedly allege that Carr acting knowingly, willfully and intentionally in making false 
representations regarding Vantage's success, its audited returns, and Carr's own investment in 
21 
Vantage, among other allegations, in order to induce Plaintiffs to buy and hold Vantage stock. 
Assuming these allegations are true, they "give rise to a strong inference that [Carr] acted in a 
severely reckless manner." GCA Strategic Inv. Fund, Ltd., 245 Ga. App. at 464. 
Additionally, Defendant Carr contends the SAC fails to adequately plead loss causation. 
"In the context of securities fraud, 'be it statutory or based in the common law,' proximate cause 
requires a showing of 'loss causation."' Greenwald v. Odom, 314 Ga. App. 46, 60, 723 S.E.2d 
305, 318 (2012) (quoting Holmes v. Grubman, 286 Ga. 636,642, 691 S.E.2d 196,200 (2010)). 
"[L]oss causation describes the link between the defendant's misconduct and the plaintiffs 
economic loss." Greenwald, 314 Ga. App. at 60 (quoting Robbins v. Koger Properties, 116 F.3d 
1441, l 447(VI) (11th Cir. 1997)). "Significantly, the way in which a plaintiff establishes "loss 
causation" can differ depending on the specific circumstances of the case at hand." Greenwald, 
314 Ga. App. at 60. 
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Carr made false representations to induce Plaintiffs' 
investments and to convince them not to sell their investments, and that in reliance on his 
representations they purchased and held their Vantage stock, resulting in economic loss and 
damages. Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to "link" Carr's alleged misconduct with Plaintiffs' 
economic loss. 
Finally, Defendant Carr alleges the securities fraud and common law fraud claims fail as 
a matter of law because "[t]he SAC fails to allege what Carr received from the supposed fraud." 
However, Plaintiffs have alleged Carr received commissions or other remuneration for soliciting 
· 21 investors. 
21 SAC, ii ! 29, 86(4). 
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Having considered the SAC and given all of the above, the Court finds Plaintiffs Carter 
and Scott have sufficiently stated claims for securities fraud under the Georgia Securities Act and 
common law fraud. The Motion to Dismiss Counts V and VI as asserted by Carter and Scott is 
hereby DENIED. 
9. Counts VIII and IX: Attorneys 'fees and punitive damages 
"An award of attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages is derivative of a plaintiffs 
substantive claims." Racette v. Bank of Am., N.A., 318 Ga. App. 171,181,733 S.E.2d 457,466 
(2012) (citing DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente, 294 Ga. App. 38, 52(5), 668 S.E.2d 737 
(2008)). Because several tort and other claims survive the instant motion, the Motion to Dismiss 
Counts VIII and IX is DENIED.22 
10. Count X Violations of the Colorado Securities Act 
Defendant Carr argues Plaintiff Scott fails to state a claim for violation of the Colorado 
Securities Act. The Court agrees. Despite the Court's instruction to Plaintiffs to provide a more 
definite statement as to the factual allegations giving rise to their claims, the SAC contains 
largely conclusory references to the Colorado Securities Act alleging only that: Defendant 
Dwyer was not registered as an agent pursuant to the Colorado Securities Act23; Defendants 
offered for sale and sold Vantage stock to Plaintiffs "within the State of Georgia and in violation 
of.. .the Colorado Securities Act"24; Scott invested $2,000,000 in Vantage and "[a]ll of these 
solicitations and investments were made in the State of Georgia or the State of Colorado'f"; and 
pursuant to the Colorado Securities Act, the Vantage stock is a "security", was not subject to an 
effective registration statement or exempt from registration, and Defendants were not properly 
22 
25 
To the extent Defendant Carr asserts that attorneys' fees and punitive damages are never available on a 
§ 12(a)(2) claim, he may raise the issue again at the summary judgment stage of this litigation. 
23 SAC, ~22. 
24 S AC, ~33. 
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registered as agents, securities salespersons or investment advisors26. With respect to Count X 
specifically, Plaintiff Scott only alleges that "[a]s a result of the conduct [ described in the SAC], 
the offer and sale of securities to [her] violates the Colorado Securities Act." 
Importantly, Plaintiffs conclusively assert that "solicitations and investments" were made 
in Georgia "or" Colorado but do provide any factual allegations in support of that assertion and 
do not articulate what conduct by Carr would make him liable to Scott under Colorado law or 
what provisions of the Colorado Securities Act were allegedly violated. Thus, Defendant Carr's 
Motion to Dismiss the SAC is GRANTED as to Count X. 
11. Count XI: Breach of fiduciary duty 
Defendant Carr alleges Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because 
the SAC does not contain any allegations that would give rise to a fiduciary duty owed by Carr to 
any Plaintiff and fails to allege how any such duty was breached by Carr. 
"It is well settled that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three 
elements: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage 
proximately caused by the breach." Engelman v. Kessler, 340 Ga. App. 239, 246, 797 S.E.2d 
160, 166 (2017), cert. denied (Aug. 14, 2017). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §23-2-58, a fiduciary duty 
may exist "where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, 
conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the 
law requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and 
agent, etc." Such a relationship may be created by law, contract, or the facts of a particular case. 
Id.; Bedsole v. Action Outdoor Advert. JV, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 194, 201, 750 S.E.2d 445, 452 
(2013). However, "[t]he mere circumstance that ... people have come to repose a certain amount 
of trust and confidence in each other as the result of business dealings is not, in and of itself, 
26 SAC, ,i,i 87-89. 
24 
sufficient to find the existence of a confidential relationship." Cottrell v. Smith, 299 Ga. 517, 
532, 788 S.E.2d 772, 786, reconsideration denied (July 25, 2016), adopted, (Ga. Super. 2016), 
and cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 648, 196 L. Ed. 2d 523 (2017) (quoting Parello v. Maio, 268 Ga. 852, 
853, 494 S.E.2d 331 (1998)). 
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants "repeatedly represented to Plaintiffs that they were 
participants in a partnership and thus were partners of one another" and, from that allegation 
Plaintiffs summarily contend "Defendants assumed fiduciary duties to each Plaintiff."27 Even 
assuming Defendants held themselves out as partners of one another, such not does give rise to a 
fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiffs. Moreover, the SAC makes clear Defendants were soliciting 
Plaintiffs to induce them to purchase shares in Vantage in an arm's length transaction. There is 
no allegation that Plaintiffs knew Carr prior to these solicitations or any basis upon which to find 
he owed Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the SAC is GRANTED 
with respect to Count XI. 
V. Defendant Dwyer's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
The Court finds Defendant Dwyer's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which seeks 
judgment as to Counts I through X of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, has largely been 
mooted by the SAC, with the exception of Dwyer's arguments seeking dismissal of Counts IV 
(negligence), Count XI (breach of fiduciary duty), and the claims asserted by Bailey and Mary. 
For the reasons set forth in Part IV, supra, Dwyer's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is 
GRANTED as to those claims only and is otherwise DENIED as moot. 
27 SAC, ill 37. 
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VI. Case Management 
In light of the Court's rulings herein, counsel are directed to confer regarding case 
management deadlines and report back to the Court within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this 
order with a proposed consent Case Management Order or, if the parties cannot agree on such 
deadlines, each side may present a proposed Case Management Order for the Court's 
consideration. 
-~ SO ORDERED this /-J;. day of September, 2018. 
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